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MUCH SPAM CAN CAN-SPAM CAN? – EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS
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Millions of email users around the world face the same problem each time they go
to check their email inbox - Spam. Every day, millions of spam emails are sent. In
response to the ever-growing spam problem, Congress enacted the Controlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketings Act of 2003 (hereinafter “CANSPAM”)1. Due to the relative youth of CAN-SPAM, no court in the nation had evaluated
any portion of the statute until White Buffalo Ventures v. University of Texas2 was heard
in the Fifth Circuit. While I[HM2] ultimately agree with the holding of the Court of
Appeals, this Note aims to further clarify the holding of the Court, and give better
guidance for the future. Part I describes the genesis of spam legislation up until CANSPAM’s enactment. Part II sets out the factual and procedural background of White
Buffalo and details the Fifth Circuit’s holding. Part III argues that the while holding is
correct, much of the analysis explaining the holding is missing. Finally, based on these
reasons, Part IV suggests guidelines for the future.
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I. Background.
A. The Very Beginning[HM3].
A better understanding of the ascendancy of “spam” requires a brief background
on the history of email. Email began as a way for colleagues to communicate amongst
each other.3 A pioneer of email described it as “a system for communication among
colleagues, and your colleagues weren’t about to bother you with stuff like spam.”4
However, the function of email was forever changed on May 3, 1978 when Gary Thuerk,
a marketing manager, sent out the first piece of spam in an effort to advertise his
company’s open house. Even from its inception, spam was met with hostility. Thuerk
received angry emails, calling his message “a clear and flagrant abuse.”5 Thuerk was
reprimanded and instructed not to send such messages again. This reprimand proved
effective and seemed to thwart other spammers from sending similar messages, at least
for the time being.6
In 1994, Laurence Canter and Martha Siegel used Internet bulletin boards to send
spam to millions of people.7 The response was much harsher; Canter and Siegel were cut
off from their Internet provider and “widely chastised.”8 However, unlike Thuerk, Canter
and Siegel were decidedly less apologetic. Their response was, “Get used to it, because
we’re going to do it again.”9 And with this brazenness, an era of mass commercial emails
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was birthed. Cyberspace was not controlled by the government; thus, there was no one to
prohibit spammers from sending out spam at will.
B. The State Response.
As Internet use soared, the volume of spam sent to email users rose accordingly
and States began to take a more active role in controlling the types of messages sent. In
1997, Nevada enacted the nation’s first anti-spam law.10 The Nevada law required the
sender to provide their legal name, complete street address, a valid return email address,
and an “opt-out” option.11 Washington followed by passing its own anti-spam statute,
prohibiting falsification of point of origin and subject line information.12 Shortly
thereafter, California enacted its own statute, requiring unsolicited messages to be labeled
as “ADV:” or “ADV:ADLT”.13 By 2003, thirty-six states had enacted spam legislation
and two states prohibited spam altogether.14 The states sought to use the same basic
formula, typically a combination of the basic provisions in the Nevada, Washington and
California statutes, focusing on deceptive practices like “misleading subject lines, forged
sender addresses, and false routing information contained in message headers.”15 Other
features included clear labels in the header and “opt-out” options.16 However, for a
variety of reasons, the state legislative attempts failed. To begin with, few spammers
complied with state requirements. Secondly, states were often unable to prosecute under
10
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their laws due to the high cost of tracking down spammers,17 ambiguities in the definition
of terms in the state laws,18 and jurisdictional problems caused by the interstate nature of
email.19
C. The Federal Government Steps In.
In mid-2003, aware of the failure of state legislation to curtail unsolicited
commercial email, the Federal Trade Commission began a forum on spam to determine
the best solution to the problem. A collection of almost 400 “bureaucrats and lawmakers,
consumers, lawyers, Internet service providers, techies and, most perilously, anti-spam
activists and spammers” sat down for several days to discuss ways of curbing what was
described as “today’s onslaught of unsolicited e-mail ads.”20 A persistent problem with
the drafting of anti-spam legislation stems from spam’s very definition.” Depending on
the context, “spam” may be defined very broadly to include all forms of unsolicited
email, very narrowly, to include only commercial emails that are deceptive and
fraudulent, or something in between. Congress ultimately defined spam as a
“commercial electronic mail message” meaning “any electronic mail message the
primary purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial
product or service.”21 By enacting the statute, Congress largely preempted state law.22
However, Congress also recognized that “the problems associated with the rapid growth
and abuse of unsolicited commercial email cannot be solved by Federal legislation
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alone.”23 Therefore, Congress also included in the statute certain provisions that exempt
Internet access providers[HM4],24 as well as state policies not specific to email but which
may affect email.25 These exemptions were included to supplement CAN-SPAM and
account for areas not covered under the legislation.
II. White Buffalo Ventures v. University of Texas at Austin[HM5].
A. Factual Background.
The University of Texas at Austin (“UT”) provides free Internet access and email
address to its faculty, staff and students.26 The UT email accounts can be accessed either
on-campus, through use of both wireless and wired connections, or remotely, through
other Internet service providers. White Buffalo Ventures, LLC (“White Buffalo”)
operates several online dating services, one of which is LonghornSingles.com.[HM6] In
February of 2003, White Buffalo submitted a Public Information Act request27 and UT
responded by disclosing all qualifying email addresses.28 In April of 2003, White
Buffalo began sending “legal commercial spam” to people affiliated with UT.29 A total
of 55,000 emails promoting LonghornSingles.com were sent.30 Although the emails were
not initially detected by spam filters,31 UT officials began to receive complaints. The
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University then sent White Buffalo a cease and desist letter, which was ignored.[HM7]
Pursuant to its Regents’ Rules which block incoming, unsolicited commercial emails, UT
responded by blocking all emails from White Buffalo’s source address to addresses
containing the “@utexas.edu” string.32
B. Procedural History.
White Buffalo filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) in the
District Court for the State of Texas to enjoin UT from blocking emails to UT students
and the TRO was issued on May 9, 2003.33[HM8] UT subsequently removed the case to
federal court.34 After a hearing in May 2003, the district court denied White Buffalo’s
petition for a [HM9]preliminary injunction and both parties moved for summary
judgment.35 In an opinion by Judge Sparks, the court granted UT summary judgment,
holding that the university was an internet access provider and that their policy was thus
not preempted under the CAN-SPAM Act.36 Judge Sparks also held that UT’s policy did
not violate White Buffalo’s free speech rights.37 Finally, the district court held that the
Board of Regents’ policy was not specific to email and instead was a general set of rules
governing solicitation using university facilities.38
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the district court. In reviewing the
decision of the district court de novo,39 the Court of Appeals found that while the CAN-
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SPAM Act’s preemption clause did apply to UT, the exemption clause in § 7707 allowed
UT to employ protective measures because of its status as an internet service provider.
III. Analysis.
A. Textual ambiguity and preemption.
The first issue addressed with respect to the preemptive effect of CAN-SPAM is
the textual ambiguity of the Act itself, which expressly preempts:
[A]ny statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that
expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages,
except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information
attached thereto.40
Although CAN-SPAM itself fails to define the meaning of either “State” or “political
subdivision of a State,”41 the word “State” is construed to encompass “other entit[ies] . . .
that [are] created by the constitution . . ., including a university system or institution of
higher education.”42 Therefore, UT is encompassed under the banner of “State or
political subdivision of a State.”43 The act also provides an exemption clause, which
states, “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to have any effect on the lawfulness or
unlawfulness . . . of the adoption, implementation, or enforcement by a provider of
Internet access service of a policy of declining to transmit, route, relay, handle, or store
certain types of electronic mail messages.”44 Due to the fact that UT provides Internet
access to its students, UT is also encompassed under the banner of “Internet access
provider.” CAN-SPAM gives no guidance as to which provision controls when a State or
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political subdivision of a State is at the same time an Internet access provider. The Court
held, “The textual ambiguity triggers the strong presumption against [a finding of
preemption].”45 However, the Court failed to explain why such a strong presumption
exists.
It is first important to further clarify what the Court meant when it referred to a
“textual ambiguity.” In the preceding paragraph, the Court discusses the two
“competing” interpretations of CAN-SPAM: 1) that “state entities may not regulate
commercial speech except when regulation relates to the authenticity of the speech’s
source and content”46 vs. 2) “state entities may implement a variety of non-authenticity
related commercial speech restrictions, provided the state entity . . . is an ‘Internet access
provider.’”47 However, applying the plain meaning of the statute, the two theories are not
in conflict with one another. The exemption clause at § 7707(c) clearly states, “[n]othing
in this chapter shall be construed to have any effect” on the legality of a policy adopted
by an Internet access provider.48 The plain language of this clause suggests that the
preemption clause is superseded by the exemption clause when the party implementing
the restriction is an Internet access provider, regardless of whether such provider is a
State agent. However, the Court confuses this issue by stating only that the exemption
clause “triggers the presumption against preemption.”49 In fact, this is not just a
presumption but, in effect, a definitive preemption of the preemption clause[HM10].
If ambiguity exists at all, it is whether a state actor may ever constitute an Internet
access provider for purposes of CAN-SPAM. The Act defines an Internet access
45
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provider [HM11]as “a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic
mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to
proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services
offered to consumers.”50 There is nothing in this definition that would exclude a State
actor, or any other entity, from classification as an Internet service provider. Therefore,
the presumption exists that an entity can concurrently be considered an Internet access
provider and a State or political subdivision of a State.
An application of the definition of an Internet access provider to UT shows that
the University is, in fact, an Internet access provider. The faculty, students and staff of
the University are able to access the Internet, including their UT email accounts, through
both wired and wireless service on-campus.[HM12]51 Although White Buffalo cites the fact
that only 6,000 of the 59,000 individuals with “utexas.edu” email address check their
accounts on-campus, perhaps in an effort to illustrate that UT is not an Internet access
provider, the Court stated, “[W]e are hard-pressed to find that providing email accounts
and email access does not bring UT within the statutory definition . . . .”52 Absent any
language barring a State actor from consideration as an Internet access provider, UT is
clearly within the exemption.
The purpose for CAN-SPAM lends further support for the presumption that a
State actor can be considered an Internet access provider. Congress, in enacting CANSPAM, recognized the necessity for a uniform law with regard to email, especially
50
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because emails are very often [HM13]interstate and there are jurisdictional problems
imposed if different laws apply when the same email is sent to different states. However,
Congress also recognized that, “The problems associate[HM14]d with the rapid growth and
abuse of unsolicited commercial electronic mail cannot be solved by Federal legislation
alone.”53 It is reasonable to assume that the existence of the exemption clause stems from
this recognition. Those that provide Internet access necessarily need freedom in order to
specifically tailor spam filters to their own users. In light of Congress’ findings that
email “has become an extremely important and popular means of communication, relied
on by millions of Americans on a daily basis . . .”54 and that “[t]he convenience and
efficiency of electronic mail are threatened by the extremely rapid growth in the volume
of unsolicited commercial electronic mail,”55 it can be presumed that Congress intended
to liberally grant entities the freedom to formulate their own spam policies as an Internet
access provider.
Finally, the provision in § 7707(b)(2), which states that “State laws not specific to
electronic mail, including State trespass, contract, or tort law” are not preempted by
CAN-SPAM favors an interpretation supporting a State’s right to regulate spam. The
District Court held that UT’s policy was not exempted because “it regulates all forms of
solicitation.”56 The Court of Appeals, in its decision, declined to address this issue
“because [it] had alternate grounds of making [its] preemption decision.”57 However,
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rather than leave this discussion for another day, the Court of Appeals could have easily
provided an answer to this issue[HM15].
Under CAN-SPAM, state laws that are not specific to electronic mail, or that
regulate acts of fraud or computer crime, are not subject to preemption under the Act.58
However, there[HM16] is some question as to whether the policies of a state university have
the requisite weight to be considered a “state law.”59 In its decision, the Court of Appeals
summarily rejects an argument that UT’s anti-spam policy is not a “statute, regulation, or
rule of a State . . . .”60 To spell this out, first, it is well established that UT is
encompassed by the term “State.”61 Second, the document that houses the University’s
anti-spam policy, the Regents Rules, clearly indicates that the policy is part of a “rule of a
State[HM17].” However, the pertinent portion of CAN-SPAM uses the word “law.”62 For
argument’s sake, I will proceed with this discussion under the assumption that a statute,
regulation, or rule, falls under the Act’s definition of “law.”[HM18]
The issue can be summarized as follows: Absent a finding that UT is an
I[HM19]nternet access provider, would its policy be exempted because it is a “State law not
specific to electronic mail?”63 The pertinent part of UT’s Rules and Regulations is found
in Part One, Chapter VI Section 6.6 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Regents
of the University of Texas System for the Government of the University of Texas System
58
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(“Regents Rules”). [HM20] The Regents Rules defines “solicitation” as “the sale, lease,
rental or offer for sale, lease, rental of any property, product, merchandise, publication, or
service, whether for immediate or future delivery . . . .”64 Although the precise nature of
the email sent by White Buffalo is not in the record, it is presumed that the email
contained an offer for the sale of dating services. Therefore, the email is covered under
UT’s anti-solicitation policy. It can hardly be said that this policy is specific to email.
The Regents Rules do not specifically mention email, or even the Internet, in setting out
its anti-solicitation rules. Therefore, the Regents Rules set out a broad anti-solicitation
policy. The pertinent portion of CAN-SPAM states, “This chapter shall not be construed
to preempt the applicability of -- (A) State laws that are not specific to electronic mail,
including State trespass, contract, or tort law.”65 While the mention of “State trespass,
contract, or tort law” may indicate that Congress had specific fields of law that CANSPAM was not meant to affect, the statute’s actual language only states that these areas
of law are “included” among those not preempted, but not that they are the exclusive
areas.
This analysis is especially pertinent because the inapplicability of CAN-SPAM to
UT’s anti-spam policy under this situation opens the door for practically any State actor
to escape preemption under CAN-SPAM simply by using a broad anti-solicitation policy
to shield what is essentially an anti-spam policy. It is hard to imagine that Congress
foresaw the situation at hand - a university’s anti-spam policy escaping preemption
because it is encompassed in their general anti-solicitation policy. The failure of the
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Court to address this issue can lead to a potential expansion of the exemption for State
actors to every State entity.
It may be that the wording of CAN-SPAM is important after all. While the above
analysis proceeded on the assumption that the Regents Rules would be incorporated
under the heading “state law”, the wording of CAN-SPAM may indicate that Congress
did in fact intend to limit the policies that could escape preemption. The section of CANSPAM that outlines the general preemption rules states, “This chapter supersedes any
statute, regulation, or rule of a State . . . .”66 However, the section that discusses what
CAN-SPAM will not affect reads:
(2) State law not specific to electronic mail
This chapter shall not be construed to preempt the applicability of -(A) State laws that are not specific to electronic mail, including State trespass,
contract, or tort law; or
(B) other State laws to the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud or
computer crime.67
The word “law” or “laws” is used four times in this section of CAN-SPAM, and there is
no indication that a State “rule” would be sufficient.

[HM21]The

inclusion of the word

“rules” in the preceding section outlining what CAN-SPAM preempts, and the absence of
the word “rules” in the section outlining what is exempted from preemption, leads to the
inference that “rules” are not sufficient for purposes of the latter section. While this word
choice may have been an unintentional one, Congress may have more likely intended
only “laws,” which presumably are more difficult to enact than “rules,” [HM22]to escape
preemption under certain situations. Applying such an interpretation, the Regents Rules,
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which the Court of Appeals characterized as “rules of a state subdivision,” would not
qualify for exemption from preemption.68
The above analysis shows that much depends on how the words of CAN-SPAM are
interpreted. On one hand, an interpretation that exempts from preemption a policy such
as UT’s ITC[HM23] policy could result in similar consequences for many of the State’s
policies. On the other hand, an interpretation that does not include policies, and limits
what can be exempted from preemption, would prevent a State entity like UT from
regulating [HM24]solicitation broadly in the hopes of reaching email solicitation as well.
While it is my [HM25]opinion that the words chosen by Congress are meant to include only
State laws, perhaps the Court will one day have cause to address this issue and decide
which interpretation is the correct one.
B. Commercial free speech.[HM26]
Having determined that UT’s policy fits under the exemption for Internet access
providers, the Court then turned its analysis to White Buffalo’s First Amendment
freedom of commercial speech claim. The resolution of this issue requires application of
the four-part test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
447 U.S. 557 (1980), the seminal case in determining the legality of commercial speech
regulation.69[HM27] However, the Court of Appeals’ application of this test is problematic
in the same way that much of its analysis of this case is in that their holding lacks the
clarity and discussion that would help decisions of future cases.[HM28]
68
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1. Is the speech lawful or misleading?
The first part of the Central Hudson test focuses on whether the speech is lawful
and not misleading. While this issue is answered easily in that both parties admit that
White Buffalo’s email was both lawful and not misleading, this is somewhat of an
anomaly with respect to most forms of spam.
Most spam messages contain some form of falsity, whether it be in the “from”
lines, “subject” lines, or text.70 An interesting issue arises when trying to determine how
much the spam must mislead the recipient in order to put the target of legislation outside
of the purview of commercial free speech. While a discussion on this issue would have
been dicta in the context of an analysis of the case at bar, a discussion would nonetheless
have given valuable guidance for future courts in deciding commercial free speech cases.
The location of the misleading data may be dispositive to this issue. Central
Hudson, in creating the threshold question of whether a message is false or misleading,
stated, “Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it.”71 If the basis for excluding misleading advertisements is to safeguard the
public from misinformation, how misleading must the “subject” line, “from” line, or text
be in order to be excluded? While it is most likely easier to omit a message from
commercial free speech protections based on misinformation in the body of the text,
which is more akin to false advertisement, issues may arise when evaluating the degree of
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misinformation required in the “subject” line or “from” line. One court has held that a
subject line stating, “Did I get the right e-mail address?” when the body of the text was an
advertisement, was sufficiently misleading to bar the sender from the protections of First
Amendment Commercial Free Speech.72 This subject line is somewhat misleading
because the sender is most likely attempting to get the recipient to read the email because
of the connotation of a prior relationship. However, if the test is whether or not the
message is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it,” it can be argued that
such a subject line can better inform the public. Because most people are likely to delete
emails from senders they do not recognize, a subject line that catches the eye and entices
the recipient to open it can better inform the recipient about possible transaction
opportunities, amongst other things, provided the body of the text itself is not misleading
or fraudulent. A narrow reading of “misleading,” such as that adopted by the Court of
Appeals of Washington[HM29] in State v. Heckel, can severely hinder the rights of
legitimate advertisers who may want to be a bit more creative [HM30]in crafting subject
lines.
To resolve this issue, the courts should look first to the body of the text to
determine if it is misleading. Absent a finding of a fraudulent, or of course unlawful,
advertisement in the body, the courts should then turn to the “from” and/or “subject”
lines to determine the effect of the misinformation, if any, in these lines in determining
whether an email fails the threshold test of the Central Hudson four-prong model[HM31].
2. Does the government have a substantial interest in the regulation?
The second test of Central Hudson examines whether the government’s expressed
interest in the regulation is substantial. In its brief, UT argued that it had two primary
72
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interests worthy of being defined as “substantial” - time and interests of those with UT
email accounts, and the efficiency of its networks and servers.
While the Central Hudson test looks to the government interest, the issue in this
case is that of a state university. The interests of such a limited governmental entity are
potentially much narrower than the interest of the entire state. However, in this case, the
interests of the smaller entity, the state university’s board of regents, and the larger entity,
the state government as a whole, are similar if not the same, and the following analysis
assumes that the interests are the same.
With regard to the time and interest of email users, the Court states, “For purposes
of evaluating the summary judgment, we acknowledge as substantial the government’s
gatekeeping interest in protecting users of its email network from the hassle associate
with unwanted spam.”73 This conclusory statement [HM32]gives no guidance as to why the
time and interests of the email users is a “substantial” government interest.74 In fact,
those that send “spam” can argue that their messages are not any different from other
annoyances in life[HM33]. While most spam is typically irrelevant or unhelpful to the
recipient, spam can also provide for “transaction opportunities that otherwise would not
occur due to prohibitive search costs or lack of consumer awareness about products
available to solve their needs.”75 A further description of what this “hassle” is would
have provided more guidance for this analysis, but absent this, I turn to what these
“hassle[s]” typically refer to.
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Loss of productivity and time are frequently reasons cited in condemning spam.
However, it could be argued that spam saves email users time, if the messages are
pertinent. A quick perusal of subject headings, provided the subjects are accurate, can
tell an email user whether or not the email is of any value to them. Deleting irrelevant
emails takes a matter of seconds and if emails pertaining to goods and services that the
email user has been thinking about consuming remain, reading these emails can provide
potential money-saving offers and information for comparative pricing. [HM34]
Also, spam is not unlike many other forms of advertisement. People are
inundated with advertisements, whether watching television, reading a magazine, or even
driving down the freeway. Yet in these other contexts, people are willing to wade
through the advertisements, or simply ignore them. If the reason for regulating spam is to
save people time, does the government have a similar “substantial” interest in ridding
people of advertisements altogether? Of course, there is more at issue in examining the
harm of spam. This discussion is meant only to illustrate that the Court’s dismissal of
this issue by pronouncing an interest in protecting people from “hassle” is not nearly
enough to prove a “substantial” interest.
I do agree with the Court that UT has a substantial interest in protecting its email
users from spam messages. First, UT has an interest in protecting its users from wasted
time. Although, as argued above, spam messages can provide some benefits to email
users, if spam messages are allowed to reach the UT email users unchecked, the loss of
productivity and time would be crippling.76 Furthermore, if the UT email users’ accounts
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are continuously filled with spam messages, the users are more likely to become
frustrated and discontinue use of their accounts, thereby negating a benefit that the
University intended to offer those affiliated with it. UT has a substantial interest in
protecting those affiliated with the University, and to ensure their time and efforts are not
consumed searching through emails to find the messages pertinent to them.
The Court similarly handles the “server efficiency” interest advanced by UT,
simply stating, “Also substantial is the ‘server efficiency’ interest . . . .”77 Again, this
language provides no guidance for future decisions. With regard to this issue, a complete
analysis would save time [HM35]by providing valuable precedent. While the volume of
emails sent by a spammer such as White Buffalo Ventures may vary, the interest of each
State actor in protecting the efficiency of its server is likely to be very similar [HM36]for
each State actor. That which constitutes a burden on server efficiency should not be
based solely on the volume of emails sent because this would lead to potentially
nonsensical line drawing[HM37]. Therefore, a determination of whether or not the server
efficiency interest is a substantial one would save significant time in the future[HM38].
The server issue is perhaps an easier one to determine than the user efficiency
argument. It has been held that there is a substantial state interest in the protection of its
servers. If the servers are overloaded by spam to the point that they no longer function,
the state’s email, and perhaps other Internet services, will be halted. Therefore, a
substantial interest exists.
3. Does the state’s action directly promote the interest?
The Court [HM39] holds that UT’s policy is clearly directed to promote their interest
in both user efficiency and server efficiency[HM40]. The policy of blocking unwanted
77
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spam serves only [HM41]the purpose of saving email users’ time and frees the UT servers
from overloading on emails. In fact, the Court itself stated, “One can hardly imagine a
more direct means of preventing commercial spam from appearing in account-holders’
inboxes and occupying server space than promulgating a policy that excludes such
material from the email network.”78
4. Is the state action more extensive than necessary to promote the interest?
The Court has no problem in holding that the policy is no more extensive than
necessary to safeguard user efficiency, but declines holding that the policy is no more
extensive than necessary to protect server efficiency. Although the Court’s analysis of
this considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant because it is
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, there are discrepancies in the analysis with
regards to user efficiency versus the analysis with regards to server efficiency.
First, the Court concludes that UT’s ITC policy is no more extensive than
necessary because blocking unwanted spam “keep[s] community members from wasting
time identifying, deleting, and blocking” the unwanted messages.79 This statement seems
to suggest that the degree to which the users are protected is not at issue. The ITC policy
is no more extensive than necessary because it fulfills its goal of preventing wasted time.
However, in looking at the server efficiency issue, the Court does not begin and end its
analysis at whether the policy fulfills its stated goal of protecting server efficiency. As a
matter of common sense, the ITC policy would fulfill the goal of protecting server
efficiency – if the server does not have to process White Buffalo’s email, its efficiency is
improved. If an analysis of the degree to which the efficiency is protected is not
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warranted, as it was not in examining user efficiency, then UT prevails on this issue as
well. Arguing this issue may be moot in that “a governmental entity may assert that a
statute serves multiple interests, and only one of those need be substantial.”80 However,
it is confusing why the Court feels the need to further analyze the server efficiency issue
while at the same time summarily dismissing the user efficiency issue.
The Court stated that “the challenged regulation should indicate that its proponent
‘carefully calculated the costs and benefits associate with the burden on speech imposed
by its prohibition.’”81 If this is in fact the rule that is to be followed, there is no issue in
applying it to the server efficiency interest that UT advances. However, there is no
indication that such careful calculation was made when examining the user efficiency
interest advanced by UT. The costs of UT’s ITC policy are the same, whether the policy
is used to advance user efficiency or server efficiency. Regardless as to which interest is
at issue, the cost is the blocking of otherwise legal commercial emails. If a difference
exists, it must be in the “benefits associate with the burden on speech.”82[HM42]
When examining user efficiency, the benefit that accrues to UT is the amount of
time saved by protecting UT email account holders from White Buffalo’s unwanted
email. Although this could add up to hours [HM43]in the aggregate, when considering the
amount of time saved by all UT email account holders combined, each user individually
is only minimally benefited by UT blocking White Buffalo’s spam.83 After all, it takes a
matter of seconds for a reader to look at the sender or subject line of the email and
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determine it is not an email they are interested in.84 The benefit accrued to UT in
protecting its servers is increased efficiency. The emails sent by White Buffalo, or any
other spammer, take up disc space and drain processing power. These resources are
therefore unavailable to process the requests of other UT users.85[HM44] The number of
emails sent by White Buffalo, estimated at 55,000, is unlikely to significantly affect the
UT servers, and therefore the benefit to server efficiency is probably not significant.
However, for the above reasons, the benefit to user efficiency is likewise not significant.
Therefore, another reason must exist to explain the distinction the Court makes between
evaluating user efficiency and server efficiency.
The Court, expresses reticence in “declaring server integrity to be a substantial
interest without evidentiary substantiation” because there might be “unforeseen and
undesirable ramifications in other online contexts.”86 In a footnote, the Court, after
warning that it is no more than a “cautionary note,” explains that there is a danger that
courts will conclude that there is a burden on a system without requiring evidence or
explanation as to how the system is burdened.87 The Court cites to a number of cases in
which such a scenario came to fruition.88 However, if the Court is simply willing to
accept, without evidence or explanation, a burden on user efficiency, the same dangers
exist. In this case, the Court ultimately granted summary judgment to UT based on its
user efficiency interest alone. After this holding, a government entity need only advance
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a user efficiency interest, and attach or even forego the server efficiency interest, and the
outcome will be a grant of summary judgment. If the Court really wanted to prevent
other courts from deciding the issue of burden on a state interest without support of
evidence or explanation, more scrutiny should have been given to the user efficiency
interest advanced by UT.
The court completely declined to address the “dicey but admittedly important
question of the public versus private forum status of public university email servers.”89
Before examining whether a public university’s email server is a public or private
forum, it is important to first understand what constitutes a public forum. In Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association,90 the Supreme Court
outlined a “tripartite forum-based framework to analyze First Amendment issues
involving governmentally-owned property.”91 The first category includes “places which
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”92
This first category is considered “quintessential public forums.”93 The second category
includes “public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity.”94 The third category includes “[p]ublic property which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”95 Essentially, anything that
does not fit into the first two categories falls into this third category.
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The difference between a public forum and a private one is important because
different restrictions can be applied depending on which forum the email server
constitutes. If the server is deemed to be a public forum, then the university may impose
“[r]easonable time, place and manner regulations . . . and a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”96 However, if the
server is a private forum, “In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes . . . as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker's view.”97
While neither the Supreme Court nor any court in the Fifth Circuit has ruled on
whether a university’s email server constitutes a public or private forum, decisions by the
Supreme Court concerning what does constitute a private forum can, by comparison, help
determine how the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals should have ruled with regard to this
issue. In Perry, the issue was whether a school’s internal mail system was public forum.
An educators’ association sued the Perry school board and teachers’ union after it was
denied access to the internal mail system.98 While conceding that the internal mail
system’s purpose was to facilitate communication matters amongst teachers, and not for
use by the public, the educators’ association tried to argue that the mail system was a
"limited public forum."99 The teachers’ association position was that it could not be
excluded “because of the periodic use of the system by private non-school-connected
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groups.”100 The court, however, rejected the teachers’ association’s argument. While
stating, “[U]se of the internal school mail by groups not affiliated with the schools is no
doubt a relevant consideration,” the court also pointed to the fact that use by nonaffiliated groups was not indiscriminate.101 For a non-affiliated group to use the internal
mail system, they must ask for permission from the school’s principal. The educators’
association failed to do this. The court held, “This type of selective access does not
transform government property into a public forum.”102 Due to the nature of the forum,
the court upheld the school’s use of the internal mail system and their restriction of the
educators’ association’s use of the system. In so holding, the court stated:
Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in
access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions may
be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the process
of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose
of the property.103
UT provides email accounts to its faculty, staff, and students. The messages are
stored on UT’s servers. The email accounts at issue here are comparable to a mail box in
an internal mail system in that mail is sent to the “owner” of the mail box.104 Like in
Perry, UT’s email account can still be used for communication by non-school affiliated
groups. Also like Perry, UT can allow selective access to the use of its system.
Although the form of selection is slightly different, in Perry the school allows use of the
system only by those organizations that seek and obtain permission while UT employs
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filters to block certain strings, the difference flows necessarily from the nature of physical
mail versus use of the Internet. Since the Internet and email are more widely used
vehicles of communication, and are free of charge as compared to the requirement of paid
postage for “snail mail,” the screening measures employed to block emails serve the
function of preventing email account from an inundation of messages.
However, there is an important difference between the Perry mail box and the UT
email account that creates difficulties in the comparison between the two. While the
purpose of the Perry mail system was to “facilitate communication matters amongst
teachers,”105 the UT email service is not so limited in its purpose. In fact, communication
amongst members of the school is almost an incidental use of the email service. Holders
of an email account may receive emails from any number of people, including those
affiliated with the school. Therefore, the UT email account is easily distinguishable from
the Perry internal mail system. The question still remains whether UT allows enough
access to email that it should be considered a public forum.
It is safe to say that the email accounts and the network system used to transmit
and store the messages, are not a quintessential public forum. For one, there is not a
“long standing tradition” of email use. The advent and widespread use of this form of
communication is in its relative youth. However, even absent this weak temporal
argument, it cannot be said that email has a tradition of use as a forum for assembly and
debate. Although, to be sure, email can be used as a vehicle for debate, its principle use
is for private communication between parties. Therefore, UT’s email accounts do not fit
within the first category of public fora.
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UT’s email system does not fit into the second category of public fora either. The
second category includes “public property which the state has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity.”106 The argument is defeated in that the email
system is not “public property.” UT correctly argues that it does not offer email accounts
to the general public, but only to those who are properly affiliated with the school. Since
the accounts are not available to the general public, they can hardly be considered to be
available for the general public for “expressive activity.”107 Although the email accounts
may be used by certain members of the public for expressive activity, especially when
account holders request such information, “selective access does not transform
government property into a public forum.”108
Applying the categories outlined in Perry, it would seem that UT’s email network
falls into category three.109 There is some support for the categorization of a public
university’s email system as a private forum. The District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma held that the University of Oklahoma (OU)’s server was a non-public
forum.110 In its decision, the court highlighted the fact that, “[a] university is by its
nature dedicated to research and academic purposes.”111 Therefore, “[t]he limitation of
OU Internet services to research and academic purpose . . . is not a violation of the First
Amendment, in that those purposes are the very ones for which the system was
purchased.”112 The Loving court also pointed to the fact that there was “no evidence . . .
that the facilities [had] ever been open to the general public or used for public
106
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communication.”113 Loving lends support to UT’s position because, like OU, UT has
purchased computers and has put a network in place of use by its students and faculty
only. There is no evidence that the system has ever been open to the general public or
used for public communication. This network can be used to serve a research and
academic purpose but, like the OU news server, the email system can also be used for a
non-research and/or academic purpose. The similarities between access to OU’s news
servers and UT’s email system support a conclusion that UT’s email network should be
considered a private forum.
Under the above analysis, UT’s email system is a private forum, and thus, the
University may reserve the forum for its intended purpose. While UT does not
specifically state what the intended purpose of its email system is, presumably the use is
for communication with the students, and to provide the students with a means of
communicating both with school affiliated and non-school affiliated persons.
Whether the email system is a public or private forum can serve as a threshold
question for future cases because the analysis is different depending on what kind of
forum is at issue. The less stringent requirements of a private forum will allow greater
regulation of the forum’s use. It is curious that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, instead
of addressing this issue first, chooses to skip analysis of the forum at issue and toil
through a Central Hudson analysis instead. The reason for this could be hesitance on the
part of the court to create new precedent, instead relying on the tried and true formula of
Central Hudson. Whether this reticence is the reason for passing on the issue or not is
questionable. However, Central Hudson would still play an important role in
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determining whether a public forum’s regulation was constitutional and court’s would
have ample opportunity to continue application of this test.
By settling this issue the Court of Appeals could have made their job easier. For
instance, in this case, the Court could have used the public versus private forum issue as a
threshold question. Under my own analysis, the UT email network is a private forum,
and thus the policy adopted by UT passes constitutional muster. Should the court still
wish to apply Central Hudson, it would be free to do so to support the holding with an
alternative means.
IV. CONCLUSION.
In examining the preemption language of CAN-SPAM, it is clear that Congress
intended to expressly preempt all state laws. However, Congress also included an
exemption for both Internet access provider and for State laws not specific to electronic
mail. The Court ultimately held that UT was an Internet access provider, and therefore,
its ITC policy was not preempted by CAN-SPAM. Although the District Court also
analyzed the UT ITC policy as a State law not specific to electronic mail, it is more likely
that the Regents Rules encompassing the ITC policy do not rise to the level of a State
law, as contemplated by Congress in drafting CAN-SPAM.
In addition to surviving preemption by CAN-SPAM, UT’s ITC policy must also
pass Constitutional muster. UT offered two interests served by the ITC policy. The
Court, after applying a Central Hudson analysis, held that the policy did pass muster with
regards to UTs interest in user efficiency, but not with regards to server efficiency.
Although the holding with regards to server efficiency is fleshed out, the reason why user
efficiency is acceptable, while server efficiency is not, is not clearly explained. It would
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seem that the Court should apply an all-or-nothing approach – either both are acceptable
interests, or neither are.
Finally, while the Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether UT’s
email system constitutes a public or private fora, a comparison to existing case law leads
to the conclusion that UT’s email system is a private forum, and therefore, UT may
reserve the system for its intended use.
In reviewing the holding of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, I find that I agree
with much of the Court’s holding. My quarrel with the Court stems from the fact that
they leave much of the analysis, instead, for another day, or for the dubious machinations
of law school students in scholarly writings.
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